




Report to the Honorable
Ike Skelton, House of Representatives

January 1995

FORCE STRUCTURE

Army's Support Requirements Process Lacks Valid and Consistent Data



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United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and
International Affairs Division

B-259184

January 30, 1995

The Honorable Ike Skelton
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Skelton:

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This report responds to your request as the former chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, that we evaluate the Army's Total Army Analysis (TAA) process to determine if its results are based on valid data and assumptions. The TAA process is used to determine the required support forces to sustain combat divisions and brigades. Support forces include units such as transportation, maintenance, military police, and quartermaster. This report focuses on logistical data and related assumptions used in the process.

Background

During Operation Desert Storm, the Army deployed all or nearly all of certain support units such as transportation and military police units. As threats to U.S. security interests evolve and defense budgets shrink, it is important that the Army accurately identify the support forces it requires. TAA is the Army's biennial process to determine required support units and recommend the type and number of support units that the Army should include in its budget. The requirements generated in this process are dependent on a variety of inputs and guidance, including scenarios derived from the Defense Planning Guidance,¹ wargaming assumptions, and logistical data that are developed for use in the computer modeling. For purposes of this report, logistical data include planning factors, consumption rates, and other data. Planning factors cover 9 of the Department of Defense's (DOD) 10 classes of supply; for modeling purposes, these factors are usually expressed in pounds per person per day. Consumption rates include such factors as the number of soldiers admitted to a hospital per day and the number of prisoners captured per day. An example of other logistical data would be the amount of support that allies can provide to offset U.S. requirements. While planning scenarios are largely given to the Army, logistical data must be developed by the Army. These data are compiled in the Army Force Planning Data and Assumptions document (AFPDA). Once the data are finalized—during TAA force structure conferences—the Concepts Analysis Agency conducts

¹The Defense Planning Guidance translates the President's National Military Strategy into defense planning goals. It has illustrative planning scenarios by theater.


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the computer modeling, which generates unit requirements based on a set of rules that determine the number of support units needed. After requirements are determined, additional force structure conferences are held where Army officials decide which units can be filled within the projected resource levels. Figure 1 highlights key elements of the TAA process for developing requirements and making force resourcing decisions.

Figure 1: The TAA Process



The Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) is responsible for developing the logistics data in the AFPDA. In practice, some of this responsibility has been delegated to the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOC), which is the Army's integrator for some combat service support issues. Biennially, DCSLOG and CASCOC update the logistics portions of the AFPDA by tasking the major commands, Army component commands,² and schools to validate the logistical data related to their areas of expertise. For example, school representatives are tasked to validate data based on their perspectives on doctrine; component commands are tasked to provide their perspectives on unique data and

²Army component commands are service components of the theater Unified Commands. For example, U.S. Army, Europe, is the Army component of the European Command and U.S. Army Central Command is the component of the Central Command.

issues related to their theater. The logistical data are presented to workshops to gain group acceptance. They are then sent forward to the TAA force structure conference, where the data are approved.

Results in Brief

The Army lacks adequate procedures governing the development and review of logistical data used in the TAA process. Until recently, Army regulations only focused on the management and validation of one type of logistical data—planning factors. However, these regulations were not followed. As a result, some data used in TAA were outdated or unreliable. The Army has revised its regulations to require that all logistical data in the AFPDA be validated and that CASCOM centrally manage the process. Although this is a step in the right direction, we believe that further guidance is needed for ensuring the validity of all logistical data, and to ensure that there is sufficient oversight of the process.

The data and assumptions that Army programmers use in the TAA process are sometimes different from what Army component planners use for war plans. These differences contribute to vastly different requirements. Since TAA requirements are the basis for resourcing decisions, these differences need to be identified and evaluated to ensure that there are valid reasons for the differences.

More Procedures Needed to Improve Validity of Logistical Data

Army documents describe the AFPDA update as a systematic review and validation of key data used in TAA. However, Army regulations related to TAA primarily focused on the validation and management of planning factors. Effective May 1994, the Army broadened its regulation to include additional logistical data found in the AFPDA. This change should help to improve the validity of logistical data, but additional procedures are needed to correct the problems we found with the AFPDA update process.

Regulations Governing AFPDA Update

Before May 1994, Army regulation 700-8 specified responsibilities for the development and management of logistics planning factors. The Army Logistics Center, CASCOM's predecessor, was responsible for managing the development, validation, and collection of planning factors, and was to recommend factors to DCSLOG for approval. However, DCSLOG and CASCOM officials did not believe that the development and management of other logistical data for use in the AFPDA, such as theater specific data provided by component commanders, were covered in this or any other regulation prior to May 1994.

In 1993, the Army Audit Agency found the Army's management of planning factors to be inadequate, and recommended changes to the process. The recommended changes included tasking responsible activities to (1) update planning factors periodically and (2) validate methodologies and assumptions used to develop planning factors. In 1994, the Army revised its regulations to improve the management of planning factors. These revisions included specifying time frames for updates to take place and incorporating internal control responsibilities to guide the development of planning factors. The regulation was also changed to include other logistical data and to link the development of logistical data to the AFPDA. While the regulation gave DCSLOG the overall responsibility for logistical data management, the day-to-day management for logistical data was delegated to CASCOM.

Previous Process Did Not Ensure Valid Data

The Army's TAA process relied heavily on commands and schools to review and validate the accuracy of logistics data. Commands and schools were requested prior to the TAA workshops to review and validate logistics data. However, we found that some data had not been validated, were outdated, or were not supported by documented studies. Because the process was poorly documented, we could not determine how widespread these problems were. Further, no organization was responsible for ensuring that the data validations occurred and were derived from consistent and sound methodological studies.

Our review of available documentation for several past TAAs showed that some data had not been validated in several years. Although some school officials believed the AFPDA contained outdated data, actions were not undertaken to validate or change the data. For instance, officials with the ordnance school, which develops doctrine for maintenance units, expressed concern in 1989 that rates for equipment that is expected to be abandoned and the rates for vehicles expected to be damaged in combat had not been updated in 4 years and, thus, were unlikely to be accurate. These rates primarily affect the number of maintenance units. In another instance, the Army engineers submitted workload factors that were outdated and had not been validated prior to the January 1992 TAA workshop. These factors measured the number of hours it takes to construct such structures as railroads, bridges, and pipelines. A new study was done only after concerns were raised about the validity of these factors during the AFPDA workshops.

We found data that were not supported by documentation. At the U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT), for example, officials that provided data for TAA in 1992 had not maintained documentation that would show how the data were developed. This lack of documentation reduces assurance that the data are valid and can cause problems during future updates if key personnel change. For example, U.S. Army, Korea, officials told us that they did not know how data on the Korean theater had been developed because there were no files or individuals who could explain the prior year's validation process.

We found that while the Army sought consistency and accuracy in the logistical data update process, no organization ensured that a reasonable methodology was used by the commands and schools nor that studies or supporting models used to develop the data were valid. We found that neither CASCOM nor DCSLOG had overseen the validation process. According to a DCSLOG official, DCSLOG has not routinely reviewed the methodology used by various proponents who submit factors and data to the process. This official stated that only if a factor looked unusual would it generate an inquiry back to the proponent to ask how that factor was developed. CASCOM officials stated that they had no regulatory requirement to review the methodology of proponents who developed logistical data.

Additional Procedures Needed to Ensure Data Are Validated

The Army's revised regulation governing the development and validation of logistical data for the TAA process is an improvement. The revised regulation requires CASCOM to examine the AFPDA to ensure data consistency, adherence to doctrine, necessity, identification of sources, and rationale of methodology. It also specifies time frames for the AFPDA updates, thus putting the commands and schools on notice when the data validation will be required. CASCOM officials stated that they have not yet defined their role regarding overseeing the update of AFPDA data. Therefore, CASCOM had not told the commands and schools what will be required of them. We believe that CASCOM should establish procedures that would specify how commands and schools are to validate and maintain all logistical data in the AFPDA. Specifically, major commands, Army component commands, and schools should be directed to ensure that their data are based on sound analytical studies and assumptions and that the methodological bases for those data and assumptions are documented. Moreover, CASCOM's guidance should specify what CASCOM will require from commands and schools to exercise its oversight responsibility. According to DOD, CASCOM is already developing procedures to improve the update

process and should complete a review of the adequacy of existing data by the end of 1996.

Inconsistencies Between TAA and Army Component Commanders' War Plans Cause Different Requirements

According to Army regulations, theater-specific data are best obtained from Army components most familiar with the region and involved in the theater war-planning process. However, we found that the current level of participation by Army component commanders does not ensure that data and assumptions used by TAA are similar to data that component commands use to develop their war plans. The result is that the required force structure developed in TAA does not agree with theater war plans.

Army Component Planners Role in TAA

Army component commands should have an important role in the TAA process. During development of the AFPDA, Army regulations instruct the Army components to review, revalidate, and submit theater-unique logistics data. Specifically, they are to provide data such as support provided by allies, theater stockage policies, and theater consumption factors. Also, as part of the TAA process, Army components identify theater-unique requirements that may be different from current doctrinal rules. This identification is required because the Army recognizes that each theater is unique and that the Army component commands are the most familiar with their area.

In practice, however, Army components sometimes believe that their role in the process is insufficient to affect the process. Thus, Army component officials said they don't always consider developing data for TAA as a priority. Therefore, some commands do not always send representatives to workshops where data are discussed and adopted. In other instances, component command representatives at the workshops have not challenged data that is inconsistent with their plans.

TAA Does Not Always Reflect Same Requirements as Theater War Plans

TAA requirements for military theaters sometimes differ from those in theater war plans. Some differences can be attributed to the fact that TAA provides a longer-term force structure outlook than theater war plans.³ Other differences, however, result from TAA and war plans being derived from different assumptions, logistical data, and computing methods.

³Army components develop their war plans for the next few years based on Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance. TAA develops the Army's future program force structure based on the Defense Planning Guidance. For example, the current TAA is developing requirements extending out to fiscal year 2003.

For example, according to U.S. Army, Europe, officials, TAA requirements developed in 1992 did not match planning efforts in the European theater because the two processes used different scenarios. TAA modeled a northern region scenario for Europe, whereas U.S. Army, Europe, used a southern region scenario in its war plans. The TAA's northern region scenario was based on the Defense Planning Guidance. U.S. Army, Europe, officials believe that TAA-generated requirements are based on an unrealistic scenario. U.S. Army, Europe, officials told us that conflicts in the southern region are more probable than the northern region; and thus, believe establishing requirements for that region is prudent. Further, force structure requirements for the southern region are more challenging than for the northern region because of the more mountainous terrain, lack of infrastructure, and the lack of host nation capability. As a result, U.S. Army, Europe's, requirements and the TAA requirements for Europe differed greatly. U.S. Army, Europe, officials stated that these difference still exist in the current TAA update cycle.

In another example, we compared TAA support requirements developed in 1992 for Southwest Asia with ARCENT's operational requirements. The analysis showed that some support areas, such as medical, maintenance, and military police differed significantly. Table 1 summarizes some of the differences between ARCENT requirements based on TAA and war plans.

Table 1: Comparison of ARCENT's TAA and War Plans Requirements

Unit type	ARCENT requirement based on TAA	ARCENT requirement from war plans	Comparison of TAA's requirement to war plans (in percent)
Combat support hospitals	18	31	58
Maintenance positions	8,260	2,767	299
Military police companies	77	107	72
Prisoner of war battalions	3	17	18
Escort guard companies	1	24	4
Guard companies	7	28	25

As shown in the table, ARCENT plans require 31 combat support hospitals, which would require 18,817 positions, and TAA requires 18 hospitals, which would require 10,908 positions—a difference of 13 hospitals and 7,909 positions. The ARCENT medical planner believes TAA uses disease and

non-battle injury rate much below what the Command believes are likely in its region, resulting in lower patient estimates and fewer hospitals. A CASCOM official responsible for medical units was unaware that ARCENT used a different method to determine requirements for combat support hospitals. However, this official believes that the TAA method is more precise.

The table also shows that TAA has about 8,260 general support maintenance positions, while ARCENT plans envision 2,767 positions—a difference of 5,493 positions. TAA requirements were developed in response to a protracted Central European scenario that involves equipment overhaul in theater. Because ARCENT does not envision a protracted conflict in the Southwest Asia region, ARCENT plans to perform most major repairs in U.S. depots. ARCENT officials said that they have not yet been successful in convincing TAA decisionmakers to adopt the ARCENT concept. However, a CASCOM official familiar with maintenance unit issues said that ARCENT has not surfaced this issue in TAA workshops or conferences.

The table also shows differences between TAA and ARCENT war plans for combat support military police companies. ARCENT plans require 107 of these companies, whereas TAA requires 77 companies—a difference of 30 companies and 5,280 positions. The ARCENT Military Police planner stated that requirements are different because TAA modeling does not adequately reflect theater geography and concentration of troops in determining requirements for these police companies. CASCOM officials stated that TAA has not addressed these issues because ARCENT has not raised them at workshops and conferences.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army take the following actions:

- Require CASCOM to establish procedures that specify (1) how major commands, Army component commands and schools should validate and maintain data for the AFPDA and (2) what CASCOM will require to exercise its oversight responsibility.
- Establish procedures and identify the differences in theater planning requirements and TAA requirements to ensure that there are valid reasons for differences or make adjustments to requirements.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

DOD generally concurred with our findings and our recommendation that procedures are needed to ensure that data are valid. DOD noted that CASCOM is in the process of establishing procedures to improve the validation of data used in TAA. DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Army identify differences between theater planning and TAA requirements to ensure that the reasons for the differences are valid. DOD believes that the two processes were designed for different purposes and yield different but consistent results.

We recognize that there are differences between the process used to compute requirements for the TAA and theater commands. These differences largely result because TAA computes requirements further in the future than do theater commands, which may result in different assumptions such as the level of unit modernization, threat, and budget levels. However, the examples we have cited are not related to these factors. Rather, the differences result from fundamentally different views about how certain functions will be performed or at what rate events will occur. Thus, we continue to believe that differences between the two processes should be identified to determine if they are valid.

We conducted this review from July 1993 to September 1994 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees and individuals. Copies will be sent to other interested parties upon request. Please contact me at (202) 512-3504, if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are Robert Pelletier, Rodell Anderson, and Blake Ainsworth.

Sincerely yours,



Richard Davis
Director, National Security
Analysis

Scope and Methodology

To determine how Army assumptions and data used in the TAA process were developed, we reviewed available documentation from past TAAs and interviewed officials at the Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington D.C; Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda, Maryland; U.S. Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; Combined Arms Support Command and Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Virginia; Transportation School, Fort Eustis, Virginia; Engineer School and Center, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; and the Medical School and Center, Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

To gain a perspective on Army component commands' participation in TAA and the relationship between TAA and operational planning, we interviewed personnel and reviewed related documents at the U.S. Central Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; U.S. Army, Central Command at Fort McPherson, Georgia; the U.S. European Command at Stuttgart, Germany; U.S. Army, Europe, at Heidelberg, Germany; and Forces Command at Fort McPherson, Georgia. We also discussed 8th U.S. Army's role in TAA with logistics planners in Seoul, Korea.

To assess TAA and theater requirements for Southwest Asia, we reviewed ARCENT's major operations plan and troop list for the region and compared it with TAA modeling results and other TAA-related requirements and resourcing documents.

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.



PROGRAM ANALYSIS
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800

December 19, 1994



Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Jr.
Assistant Comptroller General
National Security and International Affairs Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Hinton,

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General Accounting Office (GAO) draft report, "FORCE STRUCTURE: Army's Support Requirements Process Lacks Valid and Consistent Data," dated November 10, 1994 (GAO Code 701014), OSD Case 9812. The DoD partially concurs with the report.

The Department agrees that shortcomings in the documentation of planning data used in the Army's Total Army Analysis (TAA) process existed in the past. However, those deficiencies have already been, or are in the process of being, corrected by the Army. A revised Army Regulation (AR) 700-8, "Logistics Planning Factors and Data Management," was published effective May 1994. That regulation (1) aligns the update of planning factors with the TAA schedule, (2) specifies responsibilities for updating theater specific logistics data in the Army Force Planning Data and Assumptions (AFPDA) document, and (3) establishes internal management control responsibilities for logistics factors. The logistics portion of the AFPDA was published in draft for use in the Army's Force Structure Conference I (FSC-I) held in October 1994. Participation by combatant commander's representatives was an important facet of the FSC-I.


The Department does not agree that there are inconsistencies between the TAA and Army component commanders' war plans. The apparent differences identified by the GAO between requirements generated in the TAA and combatant commander's operation plans are due to the differences between the *future* force planning process associated with the DoD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process used to develop operations plans for *near-term* operations. The two systems are legitimately based upon different periods years apart, different modernization levels, different budget levels, and different threats. Those two processes were designed for different purposes and yield different--but *consistent*--results.



Appendix II
Comments From the Department of Defense

The detailed DoD comments on the draft report findings and recommendations are provided in the enclosure. The DoD appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'W. J. Lynn', is written over the printed name.

William J. Lynn
Director
Program Analysis and Evaluation

Enclosure

GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED NOVEMBER 10, 1994
(GAO CODE 701014) OSD CASE 9812

"FORCE STRUCTURE: ARMY'S SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS PROCESS LACKS
VALID AND CONSISTENT DATA"

* * * * *

FINDINGS

FINDING A: Army's Total Army Analysis (TAA) Process. The GAO reported that the TAA process is the Army's biennial process to determine required support units and recommend the type and number of support units that the Army should include in its budget. The GAO noted that the requirements generated in the process are dependent on a set of planning scenarios derived from the Defense Planning Guidance, war-gaming assumptions, and logistical data that are developed for use in the computer modeling.

The GAO reported that the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) is responsible for the logistics planning factors and data in the Army Force Planning Data and Assumptions document (AFPDA). The GAO noted that in practice, some of the responsibility has been delegated to the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM)--the Army integrator for some combat service support issues. The GAO also noted that biennially, the DCSLOG and the CASCOM update the logistics portions of the AFPDA by tasking the major commands, Army component commands, and schools to validate the logistical data related to their areas of expertise. (pp. 2-3/GAO Draft Report)

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The current Total Army Analysis is a complex, comprehensive, and fully coordinated process to build the Army force structure. The TAA fulfills the Secretary of the Army's Title 10 U.S. Code 3062 (b) statutory responsibility that the Army be "organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land." The process includes conferences and senior level reviews in which assumptions, data, and force structure requirements and authorizations are reviewed by representatives from the entire Army, including representatives of the combatant commanders.

FINDING B: Regulations Governing the AFPDA Update. The GAO reported that before May 1994, Army Regulation (AR) 700-8 specified responsibilities for the development and management of logistics planning factors. The GAO noted that the Army Logistics Center, the CASCOM's predecessor, was responsible for managing the development, validation, and collection of planning factors and was to recommend factors to the DCSLOG for approval. The GAO indicated that, however, DCSLOG and CASCOM officials did not believe that

Enclosure

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Now on pp. 3-4.

development and management of other logistical data found in the AFPDA, such as theater specific data provided by component commanders, were covered in this or any other regulation.

The GAO reported that in 1993, the Army Audit Agency found the Army's management of planning factors to be inadequate, and recommended changes to the process. The GAO reported that the recommended changes included tasking responsible activities to (1) update planning factors periodically and (2) validate methodologies and assumptions used to develop planning factors. The GAO noted that in 1994, the Army revised its regulations to improve the management of planning factors. The GAO also noted that the revisions included specifying time frames for updates to take place, and requiring internal control checklists to guide the development of planning factors. The GAO pointed out that the regulation was also changed to include other logistical data and to link the development of logistical data to the AFPDA. The GAO indicated that while the regulation gave the DCSLOG the overall responsibility for logistical data management, the day-to-day management for logistical data was delegated to the CASCOM. (pp. 4-5/GAO Draft Report)

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Department concurs that, in the past, shortcomings existed in the Army's documentation of logistics planning factors. However, the remarks made by the ODCSLOG and CASCOM officials are inconsistent with Army regulation and policy.

Theater specific data are covered in the new AR 700-8, "Logistics Planning Factors and Data Management," effective in May 1994. This revision (1) aligns the update of planning factors with the TAA and incorporates responsibilities for update of theater specific logistics data in the AFPDA; (2) incorporates internal management control responsibilities for logistics factors; and (3) specifies and tasks Army Components of the Unified Commands to provide theater-specific data.

In July 1994 the Army DCSLOG chaired the AFPDA Worldwide Conference at the CASCOM to review and approve update information submitted by major commands, combatant commands, and others. The logistics planning factors and the methodologies used to compute them were approved by the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics in October 1994. Also in October 1994, the updated logistics portion of the AFPDA was published in draft by the Army Concepts Analysis Agency and distributed for use by participants from across the Army at the TAA Force Structure Conference I.

FINDING C: Previous Process Did Not Ensure Valid Data. The GAO reported that the Army TAA process relied heavily on commands and schools to review and validate the accuracy of logistics data. The GAO noted that commands and schools were requested prior to the TAA workshops to review and validate logistics data. The GAO also noted that some data had not been validated, were outdated, or not supported by documented studies. Because the process was poorly documented, the GAO could not determine how widespread the problems were. The GAO indicated that no organization was responsible for ensuring that the data validations occurred and were derived from consistent and sound methodological studies.

The GAO review of available documentation for several past TAAs showed that some data had

Appendix II
Comments From the Department of Defense

not been validated in several years. The GAO noted that although some school officials believed the AFPDA contained outdated data, actions were not undertaken to validate or change the data. The GAO noted, for example, that officials with the ordnance school, which develops doctrine for maintenance units, expressed concern in 1989 that rates for equipment that is expected to be abandoned and the rates for vehicles expected to be damaged in combat had not been updated in four years and, thus, were unlikely to be accurate. The GAO indicated that the rates primarily affect the number of maintenance units.

The GAO noted that at the U.S. Army Central Command, for example, officials that provided data for the TAA in 1992 had not maintained documentation that would show how the data were developed. The GAO pointed out that this lack of documentation reduces assurance that the data are valid and can cause problems during future updates if key personnel change. The GAO noted, for example, U.S. Army Korea officials stated that they did not know how data on the Korean theater had been developed because there were no files or individuals who could explain the prior year's validation process.

The GAO found that while the Army sought consistency and accuracy in the logistical data update process, those responsibilities were not assigned to any organization. The GAO noted that no organization ensured that a reasonable methodology was used by the commands and schools and that studies or supporting models used to develop the data were valid. The GAO found that neither the CASCOM nor the DCSLOG had overseen the validation process. The GAO mentioned that according to a DCSLOG official, the DCSLOG has not routinely reviewed the methodology used by various proponents who submit factors and data to the process. The GAO noted that this official stated that only if a factor looked unusual would it generate an inquiry back to the proponent to ask how that factor was developed. The GAO also found that CASCOM officials stated that they had no regulatory requirement to review the methodology of proponents who developed logistical data. (pp. 5-6/GAO Draft Report)

DOD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The DoD agrees that shortcomings in the Army's documentation of data used in the TAA process existed. The DoD does not agree, however, that key data that drive force structure requirements were invalid or logically inconsistent.

To correct perceived AFPDA shortcomings from the previous TAA, a number of changes were implemented in the current TAA cycle. In the past, the AFPDA was used to document after-the-fact data used in the TAA process. In October 1994, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics approved the Logistics Planning Factors. Also in October 1994, the logistics part of the AFPDA was published in draft by the Concepts Analysis Agency and distributed for use by participants from across the Army at the TAA Force Structure Conference I. Participation by combatant commander's representatives was an important facet of this Force Structure Conference. The CASCOM continues to develop procedures to refine the update process. In addition, the CASCOM has assigned personnel to be responsible for documenting data.

FINDING D: Additional Procedures Needed to Ensure Data is Validated. The GAO observed that the revised Army regulation governing the development and validation of logistical data for the TAA process is an improvement. The GAO noted that the revised regulation now requires the CASCOM to examine the AFPDA to ensure data consistency,

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Now on pp. 4-5.

See comment 1.

Now on pp. 5-6.

adherence to doctrine, necessity, identification of sources, and rationale of methodology. The GAO reported that it also specifies timeframes for the AFPDA updates, thus putting the commands and schools on notice when the data validation will be required. The GAO pointed out that CASCOM officials stated that they have not yet defined their role regarding overseeing the update of AFPDA data. The GAO noted that, therefore, the CASCOM had not told the commands and schools what will be required of them. (p. 7/GAO Draft Report)

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Department agrees that additional procedures are needed to ensure that data are validated. The Army is in the process of establishing those procedures.

In July 1994, the ODCSLOG chaired the AFPDA Worldwide Conference. The logistics planning factors and the methodologies utilized to compute them were approved for use by the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics in October 1994. The logistics portion of the AFPDA was also published in draft for use by participants from across the Army at TAA Force Structure Conference I. The CASCOM is continuing to develop procedures to refine the update process, in accordance with the revised AR 700-8. The CASCOM will examine the adequacy of existing data and review the sole authoritative source for each data element. Additional documentation and validation procedures and criteria will be established. (See the DoD response to Recommendation 1).

FINDING E: Army Component Planners Role in the TAA. The GAO reported that the Army component commands should have an important role in the TAA process. The GAO noted that during development of the AFPDA, Army regulations instruct the Army components to review, revalidate, and submit theater-unique logistics data. The GAO also noted that the Army components are to provide data such as support provided by allies, theater stockage policies, and theater consumption factors. The GAO pointed out that, as part of the TAA process, regulations instruct Army components to identify theater-unique requirements that may be different from current doctrinal rules. The GAO determined that this identification is required because the Army recognizes that each theater is unique and that the Army component commands are the most familiar with their area.

Now on p. 6.

The GAO noted that in practice, however, Army components sometimes believe that their role in the process is insufficient to affect the process. The GAO also noted that, thus, Army component officials said they don't always consider developing data for the TAA as a priority. The GAO pointed out that, therefore, some commands do not always send representatives to workshops where data are discussed and adopted. The GAO indicated that in other instances, component command representatives at the workshops have not challenged data that is inconsistent with their plans. (p. 8/GAO Draft Report)

See comment 2.

DOD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. The Department agrees that Army component commands should have an important, visible role in the TAA process. The DoD does not agree, however, that the role of the component commands is insufficient to affect the TAA process. Each combatant commander is invited to send representatives. The TAA is conducted in a manner to allow a broad range of Army commands and activities to examine all of the inputs. There has been ample opportunity to test and discuss data that appear inconsistent with combatant planning requirements. Participation by combatant commander's representatives was an

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important facet of the recent TAA Force Structure Conference I and General Officer Steering Conference I.

FINDING F: The TAA Does Not Always Reflect Same Requirements as Theater War Plans. The GAO reported that the TAA requirements for military theaters sometimes differ from those in theater war plans. The GAO noted that some differences can be attributed to the fact that the TAA provides a longer term force structure outlook than theater war plans. The GAO indicated that other differences, however, result from TAA and war plans being derived from different assumptions, logistical data, and computing methods.

The GAO also noted, for example, that according to U.S. Army Europe officials, TAA requirements developed in 1992 did not match planning efforts in the European theater because the two processes used different scenarios. The GAO pointed out that the TAA modeled a Northern region scenario for Europe, whereas the U.S. Army Europe used a Southern region scenario in its war plans. The GAO reported that the TAA's Northern region scenario was based on the Defense Planning Guidance. The GAO reported that the U.S. Army Europe officials believe that TAA-generated requirements are based on an unrealistic scenario. The GAO observed that the U.S. Army Europe officials indicated that conflicts in the Southern region are more probable than the Northern region and thus establishing requirements for that region is prudent. The GAO noted, further, force structure requirements for the Southern region are more challenging than the Northern region because of the more mountainous terrain, lack of infrastructure, and the lack of host nation capability. The GAO found that, as a result, the U.S. Army Europe's requirements and the TAA requirements for Europe differed greatly. The GAO noted that the U.S. Army Europe officials stated that the differences still exist in the current TAA update cycle.

The GAO compared TAA support requirements developed in 1992 for Southwest Asia with ARCENT's operational requirements. The GAO analysis showed that some support areas such as medical, maintenance, and military police differed significantly, as follows:

- TAA requires 18 hospitals, and 10,908 positions, while ARCENT plans require 31 combat support hospitals and 18,817 positions--a difference of 13 hospitals and 7,909 positions;
- TAA has about 8,260 general support maintenance positions, while ARCENT plans envision 2,767 positions--a difference of 5,493 positions; and
- TAA war plans for 77 combat support military police companies, while ARCENT plans require 107 of these companies--a difference of 30 companies and 5,280 positions. (pp. 8-11/GAO Draft Report)

DOD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The Department agrees that there are apparent differences between TAA requirements and combatant commanders' operations plans. The Department does not agree, however, that those differences represent inconsistencies.

The draft report discussion refers to the previous TAA cycle, (FY 1996-2001). Since that

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time, the set of jointly developed Illustrative Planning Scenarios referred to in the draft report has been changed, as have other key planning assumptions. The DoD agrees that differences between the TAA and theater war plans should be expected. However, the GAO implies that the differences in force structure requirements are simply a function of logistical data inputs. The process, however, is not that simple. Rather, the TAA is a complex, comprehensive, conscientious, and fully coordinated process designed to establish force structure for future years based on assessed threats, anticipated technological advances, and projected budgets. The Service Secretary has the responsibility to raise, organize, train, and sustain forces for employment by the combatant commanders. The TAA is a major process in force planning supporting the scheduled decision deadlines of the DoD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. The TAA process includes sufficient open fora in which force structure requirements and authorizations are reviewed by major command representatives of the entire Army, including representatives of the combatant commanders. The Service force planning and attendant force modernization processes are so complex that they must be done many years in advance to produce capable forces ready for current operations.

In an entirely different process, the Joint Chiefs of Staff-published Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process, through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, assigns combatant commanders the tasks of developing operation plans or Concept Summaries for specific Major Regional Contingencies or Lesser Regional Contingencies, typically for execution within the next 24 months. For security reasons, operation plans must not be widely disseminated. By their nature, the plans detail actions the regional Commander-in-Chief (CINC) may intend to take. In the interest of security, actual CINC intentions must not be debated in the open fora associated with programming and force structure decisions in many headquarters and across all of the Services. For that reason, the Illustrative Planning Scenarios are developed as part of the Defense Planning Guidance process to provide a generic set of plausible scenarios, from which the Services can project the Program Objective Memorandum out into the future. Program and force structure decisions can be made across the Services and throughout the Department with as much in-depth analysis and discussion as is necessary to develop a rational force for a range of conflicts well into the next century. While a CINC may plan for a worst case scenario, the TAA must build a consistent, constrained force balancing risk and scarce resources. For example, a CINC might plan for a 15-day medical evacuation policy. In contrast, the open TAA process may determine that a much shorter evacuation policy is more realistic for the allocation of scarce authorizations. The apparent difference in medical structure may be significant, but the two force structures are legitimately based upon different periods seven years apart, different modernization levels, different budget levels, and different threats. Further, combatant commanders may adjust plans continually as host nation support agreements change. In contrast, the biennial TAA cycle moves forward with the best information available at each particular scheduled decision point. Combatant commanders are invited to send representatives to every major event in the TAA process. Participation by combatant commander's representatives was an important facet of the recent Force Structure Conference I.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army require the CASCOT to establish procedures that specify how major commands, Army component commands, and schools should validate and maintain data for the AFPDA and what the CASCOT will require to exercise its oversight responsibility. (p. 11/GAO Draft Report)

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The DoD agrees that procedures to validate and maintain data for the AFPDA are necessary. In fact, actions have already been taken to implement the GAO recommended actions. As discussed in the DoD response to Finding D, in October 1994, the logistics planning factors and the methodologies utilized to compute them were approved for use by the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. In addition, the logistics portion of the AFPDA has been published in draft form. The CASCOT is already developing procedures to improve the update process, in accordance with the May 1994 Army Regulation 700-8. By the end of 1996, the CASCOT will complete an examination of the adequacy of existing data and will review the sole authoritative source for each data element. As implementation of the new Army Regulation 700-8 continues, the DCSLOG will provide further guidance as necessary.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army should establish procedures and identify the differences in theater planning requirements and TAA requirements to ensure that there are valid reasons for differences or make adjustments to requirements. (p. 11/GAO Draft Report)

DOD RESPONSE: Nonconcur. The Department does not agree that the differences between TAA requirements and theater planning requirements reflect inconsistencies. As discussed in the DoD response to Finding F, the current Total Army Analysis is a comprehensive process to build Army force structure. The TAA fulfills the Secretary of the Army's Title 10 U.S. Code 3062 (b) statutory responsibility that the Army be "organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land." The process includes sufficient open fora in which force structure requirements and authorizations are examined carefully by major command representatives of the entire Army, including warfighting CINC representatives. Combatant commanders prepare operation plans, as required by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, typically for execution within the next 24 months. The apparent differences in requirements may appear significant, but the two plans are based upon different periods up to seven years apart, different budget levels, and different threats. Creation of operation plans is consistent with a combatant commander's 10 U.S. Code 164 responsibilities. The Total Army Analysis process is comprehensive and open enough to allow thorough examination of any significant input differences, so that force structure deficiencies may be resolved well in advance of a combatant commander's current operations.

The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's (DOD) letter dated December 19, 1994.

GAO Comments

1. We continue to believe that the Army's Total Army Analysis (TAA) process did not ensure valid data, based on the problems we found with the process. DOD describes improvements made during the current TAA; we did not review the improvements, and thus, we cannot comment on them. However, as DOD acknowledges in its response, additional procedures are needed to ensure that data are validated.
2. Our information is based on numerous discussions with theater command representatives at Army Central Command and U.S. Army, Europe. These individuals indicated that theater command participation is not comprehensive and conscientious enough to ensure that theater perspectives are considered in the process.
3. We recognize that there are differences between the process used to compute requirements for the TAA and theater commands. These differences largely result because TAA computes requirements further in the future than do theater commands, which may result in different assumptions, such as the level of unit modernization, threat, and budget levels. However, the examples we have cited are not related to these factors. While DOD believes that the TAA process includes sufficient open forums in which force requirements are reviewed by representatives of theater commanders, many theater representatives believe their perspectives are not always included in the TAA process. Because we did not have access to these debates, we could not ascertain to what degree theater perspectives are raised or how differences are resolved. Therefore, we continue to believe that differences between the two processes should be identified to determine if they are valid.